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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case involves the enforceability of a contractual prov1s1on entered into between

Melaleuca and Appellants, under which Appellants are simply required to repay commissions
improperly received from Melaleuca after the Appellants' material breach of the contract.
Melaleuca, Inc. is an international, Idaho-based direct marketing corporation that formulates,
manufactures, and sells nutritional, personal care, and household products such as dietary
supplements, cleaning products, cosmetics, and shampoo in approximately fifteen countries.
(Opinion, Decision, and Order, R. Vol. I, p. 58; Injunction Against Max, District of Idaho, R.
Vol. II, p. 202). Appellants are former Melaleuca Marketing Executives. To put this appeal in
its proper context, Meialeuca here provides an overview of its business model, its standard
contractual non-solicitation provision called "Policy 20," the Foellers' uncontested breaches of
that provision, and the proceedings below.

11.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
A.

Melaleuca's Business Model, Consumer Direct Marketing®, Relies On
Organizations Of Marketing Executives That Are Susceptible To Raiding.

Melaleuca owes its growth and success to the quality of its products and to the strength of
its business model, a trademarked system called Consumer-Direct Marketing@. Unlike a multilevel marketing company, where independent distributors purchase and resell inventory to an end
consumer, Melaleuca's Consumer Direct Marketing® method relies on independent Marketing
Executives who promote Melaleuca's products and refer customers to Melaleuca. (R. Vol. I., pp.
98-99,

il 13 ).

Those customers purchase products directly from Melaleuca itself on a monthly
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basis, with no intermediary, via Internet or telephone. (R. Vol. I, p. 79,

ii

12, R. Vol. II, p. 202).

Marketing Executives build a Marketing Organization with Melaleuca consisting of the
customers enrolled by that Marketing Executive and the Marketing Executives he or she supports
(as well as the customers and Marketing Executives enrolled and/or supported by those
Marketing Executives, and so on). (R. Vol. II, p. 112,

iJ 7).

Marketing Executives' compensation is based on the monthly purchases made directly by
customers from Melaleuca, and they are further compensated for training, motivating, and
otherwise supporting other Marketing Executives. (R. Vol. I, pp. 78-79,

il

9; id., p. 96,

il

3).

Specifically, compensation is based on the products purchased by customers within their
Melaleuca organization, plus a number of factors that measure the level of leadership provided
by the Marketing Executive, including the number of customers the Marketing Executive has
enrolled, the Marketing Executive's status, the total volume of their Melaleuca organization, and
the Leadership Points that the Marketing Executive generates through specified leadership
activities. (Id., p. 78,

iJ 7; id., p.

112,

~

5).

Melaleuca invests substantial time, energy and money into training and encouraging
Marketing Executives to develop the skills needed to build their organizations and promote
Melaleuca's products. (Id., pp. 96-101,

~iJ

12, 18, 20-21). Because of the leadership, training,

and efforts provided by other Marketing Executives and Melaleuca's own investments, the
ultimate size and scope of a Marketing Executives' organization is not a reflection of that
Marketing Executives' individual efforts. (Id., p. 101,

iJ 22)

Indeed, most of the individuals in a

Marketing Executive's organization at any given time will not have even have been personally
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introduced to Melaleuca by the Marketing Executive, but will instead have been introduced to
the company by someone else. (Id., p. I 12,

~'

7).

In short, Marketing Executives and their Marketing Organizations lie at the heart of
Consumer Direct J\1arketing@, and constitute a valuable resource for Melaleuca. Melaleuca has
become one of the largest and most successful direct selling companies in the United States.
Because of the knowledge, information, credibility, influence, skills, and training they receive,
tv1elaleuca's Marketing Executives are a target for other companies, such as multi-level
marketing companies (which employ a different business model), that rely on sales or marketing
contractors to distribute their product. (R. Vol. I, p. 76,

ii

id., p. 80,

il

l 3). Such companies

often resort to raiding, in which they encourage former Marketing Executives to use the special
influence they have obtained through their association with Melaleuca to persuade or attempt to
persuade current t\.farketing Executives to leave Melaleuca. (Id, p. 80,

~

13; id, p. 95

~

4).

When a former Marketing Executi vc raids .Melaleuca. relationships can be manipulated to
cause the loss of a large portion of the Marketing Organization and customer base. (Id., p. 95
6).

ii

Raiding harms Melaleuca because it significantly impacts the incomes of Melaleuca's

independent Marketing Executives, and the company loses its independent Marketing Executives
and customers. (Id., pp. 97-98,

i·~

8, I 0). The precipitous departure of Marketing Executives

and customers caused by a former colleague using his or her special knowledge and influence to
raid can have a devastating effect on the ability of Marketing Executives that remain with
Melaleuca to maintain their livelihood after investing significant time and effort to build a
successful business. (Id., p. 97,
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i;~

5-6, 8). This has a significant impact on the morale and

confidence of any Marketing Executives who remain with Melaleuca because they must start
over in rebuilding what was destroyed. (Id). It also naturally affects the confidence of other
Marketing Executives as they watch the hard work or others be destroyed and wonder if the same
thing is going to happen to them.
B.

Policy 20, Mclaleuca's Non-Solicitation Provision, Protects Mclalcuca's
Business And That Of Its Marketing Executives.

To protect the investments of Melaleuca's Marketing Executives against raiding and its
harmful results, as well as the company's investments, all Marketing Executives agree to nonsolicitation provisions in their Independent Marketing Executive Agreement ("IMEA"),
encapsulated primarily in a provision known as Policy 20. (R. Vol. I p. 59). Non-solicitation
clauses like those contained in Policy 20 are critical to the long-term viability of Melaleuca, and
offer protections to the individual Marketing Executives who remain with Melaleuca despite the
departure of another member of their Marketing Organization. (R. Vol. I, p. 84 ).
Specifically, Policy 20 prohibits current Marketing Executives from recruiting current
Marketing Executives or customers into another business venture, and prohibits former
Marketing Executives from recruiting certain categories of current Marketing Executives into
other business ventures for 12 months after termination of an IMEA. (R. Vol. III, pp. 348-49). 1
The interests that Policy 20 serves are expressly stated in the agreement:

1

Recruit is defined as "1) to attempt to enroll, enlist or solicit an individual or entity to join a
business, program, or organization; or 2) to attempt to promote, influence or encourage an
individual or entity to join a business, program, or organization; or 3) to present, or participate or
assist in the presentation of a business, program, organization or its products. To constitute
recruiting, such efforts or attempts may be performed either directly through personal contact or
indirectly through a third party." (Id, p. 353).
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Melaleuca and its Marketing Executives have made a great investment in the
establishment of organizations consisting of Customers and Marketing
Executives. This constitutes one of Melaleuca' s most valuable assets. . . . In
order to protect the efforts of all Marketing Executives in building and
maintaining their individual Marketing Organizations and Customer bases, and in
order to protect Melaleuca's interest in the overall Customer base, Marketing
Executives and all members of their Immediate Household are required to abide
by the non-solicitation restrictions set out in Policy 20.
(Id.). Thus, while Marketing Executives are free to terminate their contract with Melaleuca at

any time, and join and be active in any other business they choose, they are contractually
restrained from "raiding their business organizations or those of other Melaleuca Marketing
Executives" for 12 months after their termination. (R. Vol. I, p. 7 5,

i; 1).

Policy 20 sets out expressly the contractual remedies available to Melaleuca upon a
breach of the IMEA, including injunctive

relief~

damages, ""''""

' certain instances-restitution.

Relevant here, the contract provides that a violation of any provision of Policy 20 "constitutes a
Marketing Executive's voluntary resignation of [the IMEA,] ... and the forfeiture ... of all
commissions or bonuses for and after the calendar month in which the violation occurred." (Id.
p. 77,

~

5). Policy 43 of the IMEA further provides that a Marketing Executive in violation of

the IMEA has no right to commissions and bonuses, nor any right, title, claim, or interest to the
Marketing Organization after the cancellation of the IMEA.

(Id., p. 78,

~

8).

If Melaleuca

mistakenly or unknowingly pays un-owed commissions or bonuses after a Marketing
Executive's breach and termination of the IM.EA, Policy 20( c) entitles Melaleuca to restitution of
the un-owed payments, and requires that the un-owed payments "shall be returned to
Melaleuca." (Id.).
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C.

Appellants Breached Policy 20 By Raiding Melaleuca's
Executives By Recruiting Them For A Competitor.

Marketing

In September 1999, Appellants Rick and Natalie Foeller entered into an IMEA with
Melaleuca that included Policy 20. (R. Vol. I, p. 58). The Foellers continued as independent
Marketing Executives-and were compensated as

such~-until

November 2008.

(Id.).

As of

September 2008, Melaleuca had paid the Foellers more than $1.7 million (CDN) in commissions.
The Foellers' Marketing Organization had 1,43 7 active customers, of whom the Foellers had
personally enrolled only 114, or 8%. (Id, p. 79,

~]

11). Other Marketing Executives had enrolled

the other 1,323. (Id.)
During their time as Marketing Executives. the Foellers also became involved with
another corporation, Max International ("Max").

(Id.).

Max is "a direct sales company that

markets its products through Independent Associates[,]" who sell products to retail customers.
(Max Statement of Policies & Procedures, R. Vol. II, p. 213; see also id., p. 221 ). As outlined in
the IMEA, the Foellers were free to join Max so long as they did not recruit Marketing
Executives or customers.

It is undisputed, however, that the Foellers breached Policy 20 in

2008, and began recruiting and enrolling Melaleuca Marketing Executives and customers in Max
while still under contract with Melaleuca. (R. Vol. I, p. 59). Over half of the Foellers· initial
personal enrollees into Max were current or former Melaleuca Marketing Executives. (Id, p.
85).
Their recruitment of existing Melaleuca Marketing Executives into Max is a clear
violation of Policy 20, which the Foellers well-knew, as evidenced by the lengths they went to in
hiding their improper recruitment. In the end, over 500 Melaleuca Marketing Executives joined
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Max International as a result of raiding efforts by the Foellers and others in violation of
Policy 20. (R. Vol. L p. 74; id., pp. 85-86). Because the Foellers hid their unlawful raiding
activities. Melaleuca did not immediately learn of their breach, and continued to pay the Foellers
commissions under the IMEA through November 2008. During the time that the Foellers were
raiding Melaleuca Marketing Organizations, Melaleuca paid the Foellers $23,856.41 (CON)
under the mistaken belief that they were complying with their obligations to Melaleuca and to
other Melaleuca Marketing Executives.
III.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
On learning of the Foellers' breach, Melaleuca filed suit for breach of contract in the

Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County on April 29, 2009. (R. Vol. I, p. 16). Melaleuca
sought injunctive relief and claimed, as damages, "all past and future costs, damages, and losses
incurred as a result of the improper actions of Defendants[,]" as well as attorneys' fees and court
costs.

(Id.

iii!

9, 11-12; id., p. 19 (also reserving the right to seek punitive damages)).

ln

particular, Melaleuca sought a return of all commissions paid by Melaleuca but not owed to the
Foellers since their first breach of the IMEA. (Id., p. 59).

2

On July 9, 2010, Melaleuca moved for summary judgment in the district court. In the
briefing on that motion, the Foellers did not deny that they violated Policy 20, nor that, as a
2

On January 7, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, in a related
proceeding for tortious interference against Max, granted Melaleuca's motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. (R. Vol. II, p. 208). Max was enjoined from
recruiting any former Marketing Executives who were in the downlines (a multi-level marketing
term Melaleuca does not use) of any current Max Associate, including the Foellers specifically,
who had been a Melaleuca Marketing Executive within the preceding 12 months. (Id.) Max
ultimately paid Melaleuca $1.2 million to Melaleuca for their tortious interference. (R. Vol. 1,
p. 74).
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result, the IMEA required them to return the un-owed commissions Melaleuca had paid them in
the months for and after the date the violation occurred. (Id. p. 44 ). Instead, the Foellers argued
(1) that the amount sought for the returned commissions was incorrect; (2) that Policy 20' s

requirement that commissions paid by Melaleuca after a breach be returned was unenforceable
because it constitutes a penalty; and (3) that the return of commissions required by Policy 20
somehow constitutes "special damages" that must be specifically pied. (Id.). Melaleuca argued
that Policy 20 requires the Foellers to return those payments to which they were not entitled. per
their contractual obligations under Policies 20 and 43. (Id, p. 50). Because the IMEA expressly
provides for the return of commissions paid, but not earned, after a Policy 20 violation has
occurred, Melaleuca argued, damages based on the return of commissions arc not "special
damages."

(R. Vol. I, pp. 52-54).

On December 1, 2010, Judge Shindurling held that the

amount of damages sought for the wrongly paid commissions was accurate but denied summary
judgment on the enforceability of Policy 20's requirement that post-breach commissions be
repaid. (Id., pp. 64-65).
After further proceedings, the Foellers moved for summary judgment on October 11,
2011, arguing only that Melaleuca had failed to produce any non-speculative evidence of
damages.

(R. Vol. III, pp. 316, 319).

On October 19, 2011, Melaleuca moved for

reconsideration of the district court's prior ruling, arguing that Policy 20(c)'s requirement that
post-breach commissions be repaid excuses Melaleuca from performance of the contract (i.e., the
payment of commissions) after a material breach by a Marketing Executive. (R. Vol. I, p. 67).
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On

December

21,

2011,

Judge

Shindurling

granted

Melaleuca's

motion

for

reconsideration and denied the Foellers' motion for summary judgment. (R. Vol. IV, p. 588).
The district court adopted Melaleuca's argument and held that the Foellers· breach of Policy 20
in July 2008 was a material breach of contract; that Policy 20( c) was not an unenforceable
penalty clause; and that, therefore, Melaleuca was entitled to the return or post-breach
commission payments. (Id, pp. 593-94). The district court further noted that the Foellers had
not disputed the accuracy of the amount of commissions required to be repaid. (Id, p. 592.) The
Foellers now appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court committed clear error in concluding that the Foellers failed to
meet their burden of establishing that Policy 20( c )(i )' s covenant requiring repayment of
un-owed commissions is unenforceable.

2.

Whether the district court correctly held that Melaleuca had established that there was no
genuinely disputed issue of material fact with respect to the amount of un-owed
commissions the Foellers must return to Melaleuca.

3.

Whether Melaleuca is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where, as here, a party asserts that a contractual remedies clause like Policy 20( c) is an
unenforceable penalty, that party bears the burden of proving that the agreed damages are not
reasonably related to actual damages, and are unconscionable and exorbitant.

Hathaway, 686 P.2d 837, 841 (Idaho 1984).
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Fleming v.

Although the Foellers erroneously equate

repayment of un-owed funds with a contractual "penalty," under their chosen mode of analysis,
"it is for the trial court to determine under the facts of any particular case whether the amount
stipulated as damages bears such reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained as to be
enforceable .... " Nichols v. Knowles, 394 P.2d 630, 633 (Idaho 1964). "The finding of the trial
court as to whether the forfeiture and liquidated damages constitute an unconscionable penalty
will not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp., 706
P.2d 34, 3 8 (Idaho 1985) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Because the district court's holding that Policy
20( c) is not an unenforceable penalty provision was not clearly erroneous, the judgment below
should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
This appeal is exceedingly straightforward.

Unbeknownst to Melaleuca, the Foellers

materially breached the non-solicitation provision of their contract with :V1clalcuca in July 2008,
but, because the Foellers actively concealed their breach, .Mclaleuca continued to pay in error the
Foellers' commissions, to which they were not entitled, until November of 2008. Melaleuca's
post-breach commission payments were not owed to the Foellers and must be returned-both
because Policy 20(c) of the contract expressly requires repayment, and because it would be
contrary to all notions of equity and fairness to permit the Foellers to keep money they were not
owed, and which they only obtained from Melaleuca by deception. The district court correctly
rejected the Foellers' unfounded argument and enforced Policy 20(c), as have all other district
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courts to consider the question.
The Foellers' arguments on appeal do not undermine that commonsense conclusion. The
Foellers do not dispute that they breached their contractual non-solicitation covenant by
recruiting Marketing Executives to work for a competitor. They also concede that under the
plain terms of the agreement, they are required to return all commissions Melaleuca paid them
·'for and after" the calendar month in which they first violated the IMEA. Instead, the Foellers
ask to be relieved of their obligation, principally arguing that Policy 20( c )'s restitution provision
is an unenforceable penalty. But the Foellers utterly fail to meet their burden to prove that Policy
20( c) is somehow unconscionable or exorbitant Moreover, Policy 20( c) cannot be considered
"unconscionable," because even if the contract did not require return of un-o\ved commissions,
under well-established Idaho law Melaleuca could still recover the erroneous payments in equity
by bringing a claim for restitution.
The Foellers' only other argument is a digression on the evidence required to establish
expectation damages--even though Melaleuca did not seek, and the district court did not award,
any expectation damages on summary judgment. The only relevant damages in this appeal arc
the amount of commissions that must be repaid under Policy 20( c).

iv1elalcuca proved with

uncontroverted evidence that Melaleuca mistakenly paid the Foellers $23,855.81 CON in
commissions in the month they materially breached the IMEA and thereafter. Accordingly, the
district court correctly held that this exact amount must be repaid.

See Mem. Decision and Order, Blood v. Melaleuca, No. CV-00-2479 (Idaho 7th Jud. Dist. Ct.
Mar.
2001 ), R. Vol. II, p. 120; :\1em. Decision and Order, Jordan v. Melaleuca, No. CV-002480 (Idaho 7th Jud. Dist. Ct. May 3, 200 I), R. VoL II, p. 162.
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I.

THE FOELLERS ARE CONTRACTUALLY BOUND TO REPAY
BREACH COMMISSIONS.
A.

POST-

The Foellers Do Not Dispute That They Materially Breached The Contract.

The Foellers do not dispute that they entered into an IMEA in 1999, that they had full
knowledge of the IMEA's terms and that the terms arc unambiguous.

Every Marketing

Executive, including the Foellers, certifies that he or she "ha[s] carefully read and ... agree[s] to
all the terms and conditions of [the IMEA] . . . and the Melaleuca Statement of Policies."
(R. Vol. III, p. 344). Provision 13 of the IMEA' s terms and conditions contains a statement by
the Marketing Executive that he or she "ha[s] carefully reviewed the ... Statement of Policies
and Definitions of Terms, and acknowledge[s] that they are incorporated as a part of this
Agreement." (Id., p. 345). In short, there is no question, that the Foellers knew that the IMEA
included the provisions on which Melaleuca here relies.
The Foellers' breach in this action is clear. The IMEA's Statement of Policies contains,
inter alia, Policy 20, a non-solicitation provision that expressly prohibits current Mclaleuca

Marketing Executives from "directly, indirectly, or through a third party recruiting any
Melaleuca customers or Marketing Executives to participate in any other business venture" and
prohibits former Marketing Executives from doing the same with regard to certain categories of
Melaleuca customers or Marketing Executives within twelve months of the cancellation of their
IMEA. (Id., p. 348).

Policy 20 itself contains descriptions of the importance of the non-

solicitation provision to Melaleuca's continued success and Policy 42 states that Policy 20 is a
"material term[] to the agreement between Melaleuca and Marketing Executives." (Id., pp. 348,
352).
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The Foellers do not dispute that they began recruiting Melaleuca Marketing Executives to
join Max in July 2008, while still collecting commissions from Melaleuca and certifying that
they \'Vere in compliance with the IMEA. J\foreover, in the twelve months after the cancellation
of their IMEA, the Foellers' violation of Policy 20 resulted in a chain reaction of over 500
Melaleuca Marketing Executives and customers being unlawfully recruited into Max.

The

Foellers offer no legal excuse for that breach, nor do they dispute the district court's finding that
the breach was material.
B.

Policy 20(c) Expressly Obligates The Foellers To Return Any Wrongly Paid
Commissions.

The Independent Marketing Executive Agreement provides that a Marketing Executive's
violation of the IMEA or the Statement of Policies results in "forfeiture of commissions and
bonus checks or other payments, ... cancellation of this Agreement, or other corrective action as
specified in the Statement of Policies." (R. Vol. III, p. 345). Policy 20(c)(i) in turn provides that
a violation of Policy 20 results in the cancellation of the IMEA "effective as of the date of the
violation, and the forfeiture ... of all commissions or bonuses payable for and after the calendar
month in which the violation occurred." (Id, p. 348). 4 Policy 20(c)(ii)

on to provide that

the Marketing Executive is obligated to return any and all commission payments Melalcuca
made after the cancellation of the IMEA: "If Melaleuca pays any bonuses or commissions to the
4

Other policies incorporated into the IMEA buttress the rights and obligations set forth in Policy
20. (See id, p. 352 (Policy 42, stating that Melaleuca may, in the event of a violation of any
policy, cancel the IMEA; that a Marketing Executive's right to receive commissions and bonuses
endures only "[s]o long as a Marketing Executive is complying with all policies and terms oflthe
lMEA;]" and that the Marketing Executive has no right to the value of its Marketing
Organization (as represented by the payment of commissions and bonuses) or any other claim to
compensation after the cancellation of the IMEA)).
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Marketing Executive after the date of the violation. all bonuses and commissions for and after
the calendar month in which the violation occurred shall be refunded to Melaleuca.··

(Id

(emphasis added)).
Application of these straightforward prov1s10ns to this case is simple:

The f oellers

recruited Marketing Executives to Max, in violation of Policy 20. at least as early as July 2008.
As a result, their IMEA was cancelled as of July 2008--\vhich means they lost any right they
might have had to commission and bonus payments from that point on. Melaleuca did not learn
of the violation until months later, and so mistakenly made several additional comm1ss10n
payments m error to the Foellers.

Under the plain terms of their contract, the Foellers are

obligated to refund those payments to Melaleuca. See Afton Energy v. Idaho Power Co., 834
P.2d 850, 855 (Idaho 1992) (enforcing an agreement that permitted, inter alia. the "recover[y by
the counterclaimant ofJ the amount of its overpayment" in certain circumstances, and to
"permanently reduce or stop future payments" in others as remedies for breach).

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT POLICY 20(C) IS NOT A
PENAL TY PROVISION.
Unable to contest the fact of their breach or the straightforward application of Policy

20(c) as a contractual remedy, the Foellers argue that Policy 20(c) is an unenforceable "'penalty"
provision. That argument is meritless and was properly rejected. A remedy clause like Policy
20( c) is presumed to be enforceable and will only be set aside "where the forfeiture or damage
fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and
is exorbitant and unconscionable . . . . " Graves v. Cupic, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Idaho 1954),
overruled in part, on other grounds, by Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 268 P.3d 1167. 1182 (Idaho

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 14

2012).

The Foellers fail to establish that Policy 20(c) meets any of the elements of an

unenforceable penalty.
A.

The Foellers Fail To Bear Their Burden To Prove Policy 20(c) Is
Unenforceable.

The main thrust of the Foellers' argument is that the judgment below should be reversed
because Mclaleuca arguably failed to establish that the amount of post-breach commissions that
Pol icy 20( c) requires the Foellers to return '·bears a reasonable rel ati on to [Melaleuca' s] alleged
injuries."

Appellant's Brief at 11.

Setting aside, for the moment, that Melalcuca's injuries

resulting from un-owed payments are by definition equivalent to the amount of the payment the
argument still fails because the F oellers incorrectly place the burden of proof on Melaleuca.
"The burden of proving facts to show that damages provided for by such a contract
amount to a penalty, either because the sum to be forfeited docs not bear a reasonable relation to
actual damages or because the agreed amount is exorbitant or unreasonable, rests upon the party

seeking to invalidate the forfeiture provision." Fleming v. Hathaway, 686 P.2d 837. 841 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1984) (upholding judgment where party bearing burden to prove contract clause was a
"penalty" submitted no evidence on the issue) (emphasis added); accord Woodger v. AMR Corp.,
677 P .2d 512, 514 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) ("It was not incumbent upon Woodger to show the
reasonableness of the relationship between the stipulated damages and his actual damages.
Rather, the burden was upon AMR to show the unreasonableness of that relationship."); M & H

Rentals, Inc. v. Sales, 700 P.2d 970, 973 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("The burden of proving an
unconscionable penalty was on [party seeking to avoid the contract]."); Magic Valley Truck

Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945, 953 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) ("The burden of proving that
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the damages specified in the contract bear no reasonable relation to actual damages or that the
liquidated damages are exorbitant and unconscionable rests upon the party seeking relief from
the liquidated damages clause."). A party's ... [b Jurden of proor encompasses both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion." Schroeder v. Partin, 259 P.3d 617, 622 (Idaho 2011 ),
quoting Cowan v. Bd. o(Comm'rs offl·emonf Cnty., 148 P.3d 1247, 1261(Idaho2006). Thus,
even if the Foellers were correct (and they are not) that ··there is no evidence'' of the relation
between Policy 20(c)'s repayment requirement and Melaleuca's damage, the Foellers ''bear the
consequences" of the lack of evidence, not Melaleuca. Schroeder. 259 P.3d at 622.
The Foellers submitted no evidence below to support their burden of demonstrating that
Policy 20( c) is unconscionable, or that the amount they are required to return, $23,856.41
(CDN), is exorbitant, arbitrary, or somehow unrelated to the damages Melaleuca suffered. The
judgment below may therefore be affirmed on this basis alone. Fleming, 686 P.2d at 841.
B.

Policy 20(c)'s Requirement That Post-Breach Commission Payments Be
Returned ls Not Substantively "Unconscionable."

In any event, Policy 20( c) is in no sense "unconscionable." A contract provision is only
"unconscionable if it is a bargain no reasonable person would make or that no fair and honest
person would accept." Wattenharger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons. Inc, 246 P.3d 961, 974 (Idaho
2010). "If a contract term is one-sided or oppressive, it may be substantively unconscionable."

Id. In determining whether a term is unconscionable, a court must consider "the purpose and
effect of the terms at issue, the needs of both parties and the commercial setting in which the
agreement was executed, and the reasonableness of the terms at the time of contracting." Id.
The district court correctly held that Policy 20( c) is not unconscionable because, as a
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matter of well-established law, when one party to a contract commits a material breach, the other
party is excused from further performance.

JP Stravens Planning Assocs., Inc. v. City of

Wallace, 928 P.2d 46, 48-49 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (holding that City was excused from

obligation to pay fees due to planner's prior breach of the parties' agreement). The Foellers'
breach of the non-solicitation provisions was material, both because the contract expressly so
states, and because violating Policy 20 directly undermines many of the "fundamental
purpose[s]" for which Marketing Executives are retained. See, e.g., Ervin Const. Co. v. Van
Orden. 874 P.2d 506, 510 (Idaho 1993) (a material breach is one that undermines the

"fundamental purpose of the contract"). In particular, Marketing Executives arc contracted to
"promote the Melaleuca business opportunity, to support Melaleuca's policies, programs. and
personnel, and to service, supervise, motivate and train the Marketing Executives in their
Marketing Organization."

(R. Vol. I, p. 101, iii! 22-24).

Recruiting Melaleuca's Marketing

Executives and customers for another business is the precise opposite of what Marketing
Executives are paid to do.
The district court therefore correctly held that because the Foellers materially breached
their commitment to Melaleuca by raiding their Marketing Organization in violation of Policy
20, Melaleuca had no obligation to continue performing, and therefore no commissions were
"due and payable" at any point after the Foellers' breach in July 2008. If Melaleuca had known
of the breach in July 2008, there is no question that, as in Stravens, Melaleuca would have been
justified in ceasing all commission payments from that point forward. JP Stravens Planning
Assocs., Inc., 928 P.2d at 48-49. It would create a perverse incentive if the Court were to reward
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the Foellers for hiding their violations and allow them to keep unearned comm1ss1ons only
because they were successful in their efforts to deceive. 5
Indeed, because the Foellers deceived Melaleuca and concealed their breach of contract,
Melaleuca paid the Foellers from July 2008 through November 2008 under the mistaken belier
that the Foellers were honoring their contractual obligations.

In endorsing each monthly

commission check, the Foellers signed their name below the following statement:
By endorsing, depositing or cashing this check I affirm that I am currently in
compliance with, and reaffirm and agree to be bound by and comply with, all
terms and conditions of my Independent Marketing Executive Agreement and
Melaleuca's Policies, as amended from time to time.
(R. Vol. IV, p. 549).

The Foellers have never disputed that they falsely represented their

continuing compliance with their contractual obligations. Had Melaleuca known the Foellers
were raiding their Marketing Organizations in violation of their commitments, Melaleuca would
not have sent the commission payments at issue.
Policy 20( c) therefore cannot be "unconscionable, .. because it docs no more than set out
expressly in the contract the "general rule [that] a payment made under a mistake of fact. and
which the payor was under no legal obligation to make, may be recovered." 70 C.J.S. Payment§
124: Rohn v. Gilmore, 217 P. 602, 603 (Idaho 1923) ("Money paid under a mistake of fact may
be recovered, if it was not due or payable and in good conscience ought to be returned.'"). Even
5

The F oellers' attempt at distinguishing Stravens fails. See Appellant's Brief at 7. The
Stravens Court held that the defendant was not obligated to pay the plaintiff anything after the
plaintiffs material breach. 928 P.2d 46 at 49. The Court did not have an opportunity to consider
whether the plaintiff was required to return improperly paid funds because the defendant had
made "no payments." Id at 4 7. As relevant to this case, Stravens is clear that the material
breach by one party excuses all performance-i. e., payment-by the other. It provides no
support for the Foellers' position on appeal. ·
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if the contract did not expressly require the Foellers to repay the un-owed commissions. equity
would entitle Melaleuca to restitution of the money mistakenly paid to the Foellers after they
breached. See Milner v. I'elharn, 166 P. 574, 575 (Idaho 1917) ("Whenever one party has in his
possession money which in equity and good conscience belongs to another, the law raises a
promise upon his part to repay it."); see also. e.g., Seuherr E-'(cavators, Inc. v. Eu con Corp., 871
P.2d 826, 834 (Idaho 1994) (general contractor entitled to return of money inadver1ently
overpaid to subcontractor); Smirh v. Noble Drilling Co., 272 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. La. 1967)
(holding "salary or commission erroneously overpaid to an employee by mistake can be
recovered"); Century Bldg. Partnership, L.P. v. SerVaas, 697 N.E.2d 971, 974 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998) ("Where a party pays money to another party under a mistake of fact that a contract or
other obligation required such payment, the payor is entitled to restitution."); Rest. (First) of
Restitution § 18 (193 7) ("A person who has entered into a contract binding upon him and has
paid money to the other party thereto under an erroneous belief induced by a mistake or fact that
the terms of the contract required such payment, is entitled to restitution from the other. ... ").
Far from being "unconscionable," allowing the Foellers to keep money they are not owed
would confer on them an impermissible windfall. The law is well-settled that in any case of
overpayment the recipient "would be unjustly enriched by the amount of the overpayment" and
payor "would be unjustly deprived of that amount if [it was] not permitted to recover it." Rest.
of Restitution, § 1 comment d (1937). Accordingly, Melaleuca is entitled to restitution of the
mistakenly paid commissions made to the Foellers after their material
ofidaho common law and under the express terms of Policy 20( c ).
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breach~both

as a matter

C.

Repayment Of The Entirety Of The Un-Owed Commissions Is Not
Arbitrary, Exorbitant Or Unrelated To Actual Damages.

The district court correctly concluded that Melaleuca is entitled to a return of the entire
amount of un-owed commissions that was paid in error after the Foellers breached their
agreement with Melaleuca and resigned.

This is the measure of damages required by the

contract, and is also consistent with the relief generally available to Melaleuca under Idaho
common law, which provides that in a case of mistaken payment, "the amount of the mistaken
payment establishes the pecuniary benefit to the defondant" and is the only proper measure of
damages.

Jones v. Whiteley. 736 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987): Rest. (First)

Restitution § 150 ( 1937) ("In an action of restitution in which the benefit received was money,
the measure of recovery for this benefit is the amount of money received.").
The Foellers do not expressly argue that the amount of the commissions they must repay
is arbitrary or exorbitant, although they appear to nod in that direction by including a perfunctory
statement that Melaleuca received some •·benefit" from the Foellers' work as Marketing
Executives notwithstanding their breach of the non-solicitation requirements. Appellants' Brief
at 11 l

However, under the plain terms of Policy 20( c ), Melaleuca is not required to prove that

it suffered damages other than the payment of un-owed commissions to be entitled to recovery of
those payments. Nor is Melaleuca required to off-set the amount of an un-owed payment
any purported "value" Melaleuca might have received from the Foellers' pre-breach activities.

See, e.g., Schroeder v. Rose, 701 P.2d 327, 330 (Idaho Ct App. 1985) ("the seller need not prove
actual injury" to be excused from paying broker's commission, and "need only show that the
realtor's breach of fiduciary duty, if it occurred, was substantial and represents the failure of a
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condition precedent to collecting a commission"); Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Jdoho, 732 P.2d 699, 709 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (upholding forfeiture clause where "by engaging

in competitive activity shortly after his contract was terminated'' insurance agent ·'contractually
forfeited his right to these commissions" and "has no separate claim for the ·value' of his
business."), abrogated on other grounds by A1etcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co .. 778 P.2d 744
(Idaho 1989); accord Sozahern Fann Bureau

Ins. Co. v. A1itchell, 435 So. 2d 745, 748-9

(Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (insurance agent "has no grounds to argue that Southern Farm Bureau
owes him money on a contract he has breached'' by violating non-compete clause). The Foellers
were not owed any of the commissions they received after their material breach, and all of the
money they received must be returned.

III.

THE AMOUNT OF POST-BREACH COMMISSIONS \VAS PROVEN WITH
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE.
The record demonstrates, and the district court agreed, that Melaleuca is contractually

entitled to recover precisely $23,856.41 (CDN) in repayment of commissions paid for the
months of and after the Foellers' breach. (R. Vol. IV, p. 592: R. Vol. I, pp. 61-62 (12/1/10
decision describing evidence presented on first summary judgment briefing and ruling that
,856.41 (CDN) is the appropriate award for commissions wrongly paid)).
Nevertheless, the Foellcrs confusingly argue that Melaleuea failed to prove its
expectation damages with "reasonable certainty" and failed to prove "intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage."
irrelevant.

Appellants' Brief at 8-9; 11-12.

This is all totally

Melaleuca moved for summary judgment only on the issue of Melaleuca's

contractual entitlement to a return of un-owed commissions under Policy 20( c) as a result of the
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Foellers' breach. Melaleuca did not seek summary judgment with respect to any other kind of
damages, and did not pursue any claim other than its claim for breach of contract. (R. Vol. l, p.
48, p. 90). While Policy 20 expressly entitles Melalcuca to seek other damages resulting from
the Foellers' raiding in the form of lost profits or consequential damages-an amount far in
excess of post-breach commissions-those damages are not relevant here. See Afton Energy,
834 P .2d at 856 ("[N]o question of construction arises where a contract, by its terms. provides
that the contractual remedy shall, or shall not be exclusive
omitted).

other remedies.") (citation

Policy 20 obligates the Foellers to refund wrongfully paid commissions, and the

amount thereof has been proven with uncontroverted evidence.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
This matter arises out of a commercial contract. As such, should Melaleuca prevail on
appeal, it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 1 120.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
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